Richards, I. A. The Philosophy of Rhetoric

(1936)

  • Often labeled—or mislabeled—father of new criticism
  • Identifies rhetoric with theory of meaning from earlier work, The Meaning of Meaning—triadic theory or semiotics
  • Argues for philosophic inquiry of discredited subject of rhetoric—the meaning of words is not science nor common sense - To revive rhetoric requires a study of verbal understanding and misunderstanding – the relationship between words, not the words with static meaning
  • “meaning minds intensely (what other things they are put with) --more indeed than any other sorts of things” (10) Words in and of themselves are nothing –
  • mutual dependence of words varies with types of discourse – but a whole utterance utters not one meaning but a movement among meanings
  • “The Proper Meaning Superstition” – that words have meanings of their own – not true – instead “the stability of the meaning of a word comes from the constancy of the contexts that give it its meaning” (11)
  • Language and Thought are not the same – can’t identify thought with “muscular movement”, but thought is most accessible through language
  • We will never directly perceive anything—all input is mediated by socially constructed and weighted categories—enthymematic reasoning is the basis of human knowledge.
  • How does a word mean? Physical metaphor of association impressions stamped on the brain gives us no useful account and the appeal to imagery as constituting meaning have messed up Rhetoric
  • Old Rhetoric was an offspring of dispute – has always been dominated by theory of battle, which is a “narrowing and blinding influence” of the preoccupation with the debater’s interest. “The combative impulse can put us in mental blinkers” (24)
  • Persuasion is only one among the aims of discourse. “It poaches on the others—especially on that of exposition, which is concerned to state a view, not to persuade people to agree or to do anything more than to examine it” (24)
  • “A perception is never just on an it; perception takes whatever it perceives as a thing of a certain sort. All Thinking from the lowest to the highest—whatever else it may be – is sorting” (30)
  • Context Theorem of Meaning – would prevent misunderstanding…would discourage out habit of behaving as though a passage cannot at the same time mean one thing and another and an incompatible things
  • Misunderstanding of metaphor– from beginning (from Aristotle) “evil presence of 3 assumptions” – metaphor has been regarded as a “happy extra trick with words” as ornament or added power, not as the “omnipresent principle of language” that it is
    • that “eye for resemblances is a gift” or metaphor is only for some. This is false because we all live and speak only through resemblances, through metaphor
    • that this “eye” cannot be taught (Aristotle : this alone cannot be imparted to another” – not true – “we gain our command of metaphor just as we learn whatever else makes us human…imparted to us from others, with and through the language we learn, language which is utterly unable to aid us except through the command of metaphor which it gives” (90)
    • Third and worst assumption – that metaphor is something special and exceptional, a deviation from normal mode of use of language – Not true – metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language
  • Traditional theory of metaphor noticed only a few of the modes of metaphor – Thought is metaphoric
  • Unlike Fish, words are not virtuously meaningless because audience determines meaning, but the meaning of words is a function for their interpretation in context—they are very important to avoid dangerous misunderstandings.
  • Great implications for persuasion and audience awareness
  • We can never be fully aware of what we are saying and the kind of inferences people may draw, but word choice helps
  • Answers are useful rather than satisfactory—his and all
  • “pure exposition is not rhetorical”
  • Old rhet say it as problem/ new rhet appreciates it as the mechanism of learning.
  • Sentence is the unit of discourse—Aristotle says and Richard agrees
  • “doctrine of usage” good and right usage of a particular word. Bad doctrine from Campbell. Richards HATES doctrine of usage. Wants interpretation and guesswork. No right/wrong or better/worse.
  • Tenor and Vehicle – we need a common terminology to describe metaphor – too confusing without – always keep in mind that words and metaphors can do more than one thing – Richards introduces two technical terms – tenor and vehicle – metaphor for the whole double unit, tenor is underlying idea or principle subject, vehicle is what it resembles
  • The vehicle and tenor in cooperation give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either - mutually limit and expand each other’s range of meanings – metaphor links literature, rhetoric, and semantics; it reveals the need for interpretation in context